Scapegoat

So Robert Gates’ confirmation hearings are scheduled to begin this Tuesday. Here are some questions that I wish someone would ask him before they vote to confirm him anyway. 1. The Iraq Study Group’s report will be released soon to the president and the American people. Does the fact that you served on this group prior to your nomination for Defense Secretary have any bearing on your likelihood to take their recommendations? Will you be willing to give other options from other sources the same weight in your deliberation process over the best way to move forward? 2. Do you intend to continue the Administration’s apparent policy of forcing generals who disagree with you into retirement? Or, rather, do you intend to take all views presented by your advisors as worthy of consideration, acknowledging that they have 20 or 30 years of experience running the military on an operational level, rather than serving primarily in an administrative function for most of their career, as you have? 3. Rumsfeld stated in several media interviews before his resignation that the “center of gravity” in the Iraq war is actually here in America, resting in US public opinion and media. Do you concur with his assessment of the situation? Or might you instead feel that American public opinion is not a military-type force with the ability to change the Iraqi’s ability to continue their insurgency? In your opinion, what IS the “center of gravity” in Iraq and how do you intend to approach dealing with it? 4. I understand that, with regards to the Iran-Contra scandal, you were ultimately found to have been likely to have known what was going on, but there was nothing indictable about your actions, or lack thereof. Whatever your actual level of involvement in that disgraceful scandal of the Reagan administration, how do you feel the Iraqi people will view you because of the perception that you were involved on some level? In other words, do you think that the Iraqi politicians and public will have the same level of trust in your judgment and confidence in your intentions as they would of someone with no connection whatsoever to an era in which the US was providing weapons under the table to aid their enemy in a brutal war? How do you think this perception will impact your ability to convince the Iraqis that whatever new strategy you develop will actually make headway, rather than being the same “stay the course” policy of ineffectiveness we have seen thus far, or, worse, something they view as being against their interests and further disrupting their violent national picture? 5. You were tapped for this job with the express purpose of changing our Iraq policy in some substantial fashion because your predecessor was either unable or unwilling to do so. (In light of the memo released since I wrote this, I maintain that Rumsfeld was offering too little, too late. If he was just going to agree with Murtha’s ideas in the end, he sure could have made some effort to stand up for Murtha while his propagandists in the media were busy throwing eggs at the man in the metaphorical pillory.) However, the President’s spokespeople are still saying that while tactical changes may take place, the President/Commander in Chief intends to maintain the current over-arching strategy because he feels it is right. Should you determine that the strategy is actually untenable and must change, are you willing to advise the President of this view? Given the Rumsfeld memo of 6 Nov., would you fear for your job if the president didn’t care for your view? Would you expect him to take that advice seriously? If not, what is your purpose in this office, other than as a figurehead? Under some non-volatile situation, I’m sure he wouldn’t be any worse a Defense Secretary than anyone else Bush would pick. Maybe he won’t continue trying to privatize, capitalize, and corporatize the military, like Rummy was trying to do. Maybe he will discontinue the potentially disastrous policy of drawing the military down into some amorphous quick-strike special ops force with a reduced capability to fight a large normal army, even as China continues to build one of those traditional large armies. Or maybe he will continue those policies. I don’t know. While those things are important, those things aren’t why he was purportedly hired. He was hired to deal with Iraq in some different way than what Rumsfeld was doing. Given the advisement that is scheduled to be given to the executive branch over the rest of the month, it is probably unreasonable to expect him to give a direct answer on how he intends to change Iraq policy during the hearings this week. That is unfortunate. However, I think answers to these questions would give a decent overview of how he intends to handle the decisions surrounding implementing that policy and how he views his own ability to be effective in that effort. I seriously hope that something changes soon for the benefit of the American and Iraqi people. However, I will continue to be heavily skeptical of anything Bush touches. If Bush doesn’t have any intention of listening to anyone or changing anything if he doesn’t feel like it, then they may as well leave Rummy in the Pentagon because, in that situation, the Defense Secretary is serving as an effective shield for criticism directed at the president. They have a word for that.